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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
These expedited and consolidated appeals require us to 
decide if the district court properly exercised its discretion 
by appointing a trustee in the bankruptcy of Marvel 
Entertainment Group, Inc., because of the extreme 
acrimony between the debtor-in-possession and the 
creditors. If we affirm the appointment, we must then 
decide if the court acted within its proper discretionary 
power by denying the motion of the trustee, John J. 
Gibbons, to appoint the law firm of Gibbons, Del Deo, 
Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione, P.C. ("the Firm") as counsel 
to the trustee. The district court determined that the Firm's 
prior unrelated representation of Chase Manhattan Bank, a 
creditor in the bankruptcy, disqualified it from serving as 
trustee's counsel. We will affirm the appointment of the 
trustee and reverse the order denying Gibbons's motion for 
an order authorizing employment of the Firm as his 
counsel. Because our legal analysis necessarily involves a 
review of the district court's factual findings, we must first 
set out the adjudicative facts in some detail. 
 




Marvel and various corporate affiliates filed chapter 11 
petitions on December 27, 1996 and continued to run 
Marvel as debtor-in-possession. 11 U.S.C. SS 1107-1108. 
Approximately 1,700 creditors held $1 billion in claims 
against the Marvel estate. 
 
Both before and after the filing of the petitions, Westgate 
International, L.P. and High River Limited Partnership, each 
controlled by Carl Icahn, (the "Icahn interests"), purchased 
at a discount a substantial number of pre-petition debt 
claims and bonds which had been issued by several holding 
companies owning all or substantially all of Marvel's stock. 
These holding companies, under the control of Ronald 
Perelman, had pledged their Marvel stock as security for 
the bonds. Two groups loomed large in the bankruptcy 
proceedings: one was an Official Bondholders' Committee 
and an indenture trustee, LaSalle National Bank, chosen to 
act primarily on behalf of the Icahn interests; the other, 
various creditors of Marvel, known as "the Lenders," who 
held over $600 million in debt claims at the time of the 
filings, secured by all of Marvel's assets. 
 
From the start of the proceedings, disputes arose among 
the various parties, especially between the Icahn interests 
and the Lenders. The Icahn interests opposed an initial 
bankruptcy financing plan submitted by the Perelman 
holding companies, under which the holding companies 
would have infused $100 million into Marvel in return for 
priority recognition of the Lenders' debt claims. The Icahn 
interests contended that the Perelman-controlled Marvel 
debtors were favoring their "lender accomplices" to ensure 
that "Perelman re-acquires control of Marvel, without 
competitive bidding, for an obscenely low price." 
Notwithstanding the Icahn interests' objections, the 
bankruptcy court approved the financing plan. 
 
From January through June of 1997, tension arose 
between the Lenders and the Icahn interests. The Icahn 
interests fought to take control of the Marvel board of 
directors. Substantial litigation went forward. On January 
13, 1997, the Icahn interests moved the bankruptcy court 
to lift the automatic bankruptcy stay, 11 U.S.C. S 362(a)(3), 
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so they could foreclose on the holding companies' defaulted 
bonds and vote the pledged stock. Marvel sought a 
temporary restraining order from the bankruptcy court to 
enjoin the Icahn interests from voting the stock and 
replacing Marvel's board of directors. The bankruptcy court 
issued the order on March 24, 1997. On the same day, the 
Lenders moved the bankruptcy court for an order 
appointing a responsible officer to take control of the 
bankruptcy, or in the alternative a trustee. That same 
month, the Icahn interests took significant steps toward 
gaining control of Marvel. They offered to infuse $365 
million into Marvel, partially for operation of its business 
but mostly to repay $300 million of its secured debt, in 
return for "exclusive" control of Marvel's operations. 
Through their agent Chase Manhattan Bank, the Lenders 
vigorously opposed this plan, explaining that the Icahn 
interests had presented no "concrete turnaround strategy 
. . . or a management team capable of executing one." 
 
On May 14, 1997, the district court vacated the 
bankruptcy court's temporary restraining order, permitting 
the Icahn interests to vote the pledged stock. In re Marvel 
Entertainment Group, Inc., 209 B.R. 832, 840 (D. Del. 
1997). With the lifting of the restraining order, the litigation 
ended and the inevitable took place--on June 20, 1997, the 
Icahn interests took control of Marvel. Thus, an anomaly 
arose. The Icahn interests began to wear two hats--one as 
creditors of the holding companies that controlled Marvel; 
the other as the debtor-in-possession of Marvel. 
 
Settlement negotiations proceeded throughout the 
summer of 1997. The new Icahn-controlled debtor-in- 
possession proposed a settlement in which the Icahn 
interests would control a newly-organized Marvel company 
merged with its affiliate Toy Biz, and would purchase the 
Lenders' claims at a substantial discount. To consummate 
the settlement, it was necessary to obtain the approval of 
two-thirds of all creditors as required under the 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. S 1126(c). The Lenders were 
not successful in obtaining this approval. 
 
The parties tried again. Another proposed settlement was 
attempted by the Icahn interests, this time with Chase 
directly as one of the Lenders. The terms were similar to 
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those contained in the first effort, but this time Chase was 
required to sell its claims to the Icahn interests for even 
less than what was offered under the former proposal. 
Moreover, the settlement proposal required the creditors to 
support the Icahn interests' control of all Marvel entities 
and to agree to place High River's and Westgate's debt 
claims into a priority secured position. The necessary two- 
thirds approval not forthcoming, the settlement 
negotiations collapsed in October 1997. 
 
On October 30, 1997, the Icahn-controlled debtor-in- 
possession commenced adverse litigation in the district 
court against the Perelman holding companies, the Lenders 
and other creditors in the Marvel bankruptcy (the 
"Perelman litigation"). It asserted 19 causes of action 
alleging breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent conveyance, 
preferential transfer and breach of contract. The complaint 
sought to void the Lenders' claims or to subordinate them 
to the claims of High River and Westgate. The complaint 
described an alleged conspiracy between Toy Biz, the 
former Marvel board and the Lenders to "sabotage" the new 
Icahn-controlled debtor-in-possession's reorganization 
efforts. At the same time, the Icahn interests moved the 
district court for an order withdrawing the chapter 11 
petitions and all related matters in the bankruptcy court 
and removing them to the district court to be heard in 
conjunction with the Perelman litigation. The Lenders 
opposed this withdrawal and renewed their motion before 
the bankruptcy court for the appointment of a trustee. 
 
The district court noted that the Icahn interests 
instituted the Perelman litigation "by counsel who had not 
previously entered an appearance in this matter. Prior to 
the filing of the action, Marvel, as controlled by the Icahn 
interests, had not sought approval from the bankruptcy 
court to retain that counsel, nor had it sought approval to 
file the action." At a conference held by the district court to 
discuss its jurisdiction over the Perelman litigation, the 
court "invited the parties to submit papers on the 
jurisdictional issue, but made clear that it did not want to 
interfere with the bankruptcy court's ability to resolve the 
underlying dispute." Nonetheless, the day after the 
conference the Icahn interests sent a letter to the 
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bankruptcy court which, as the district court found, 
"incorrectly stated that while that motion [on jurisdiction] 
was pending, the bankruptcy court was required to refrain 
from taking further action." This caused the bankruptcy 
court to cancel its hearing on the appointment of a trustee. 
 
At a district court hearing on November 13, 1997, all 
parties agreed to the withdrawal of the Marvel cases from 
the bankruptcy court and their transfer to the district 
court. The district court then heard argument on whether 
a trustee should be appointed. The argument was 
summarized by the court: 
 
        In opposing the motion, the Debtors accuse the 
       Lenders, and specifically Chase, of flip-flopping on 
       positions throughout the life of this proceeding, 
       whenever it suits their purposes. The Debtors describe 
       the reorganization plan of the Lenders and Toy Biz as 
       illegal, and claim that the Lenders have no desire that 
       a neutral trustee be appointed. . . . They claim that the 
       Lenders have put a strangle-hold on the Debtor's 
       financing, and that the Lenders are responsible for 
       failure of both the Settlement and the Second 
       Settlement. They also repeat many of the allegations 
       made in the Perelman litigation. . . . 
 
        The Creditors Committee describes the relationship 
       between the Icahn interests and the Lenders as having 
       reached an "impasse." . . . 
 
        In support of their motion, the Lenders accuse the 
       Icahn interests of an elaborate scheme to take over 
       Marvel at a discount price while diminishing the value 
       of the Lender's claims on the company as creditors. 
       They claim that the Perelman litigation is part of that 
       scheme, and was brought, at least in part, as a weapon 
       to punish the Lenders for not consummating the two 
       Settlements. . . . The Lenders claim that the present 
       board is incapable of neutrality, and is guilty of 
       breaching its fiduciary duties to creditors. 
 
Appellants High River's and Westgate's Ex. C at 7-8. On 
December 12, 1997, the district court granted the motion 
authorizing the United States Trustee to appoint a trustee. 
 
                                9 
  
Appealing that order are Marvel and the Icahn interests 
which control it. 
 
The U.S. Trustee recommended Gibbons to serve as 
trustee. Pursuant to this recommendation, Gibbons 
disclosed that the Firm was representing Chase in an 
unrelated matter. The representation did not involve 
litigation, but only construction financing for the New 
Jersey Performing Arts Center, a community organization. 
The Firm's representation of Chase generated a total of 
$48,000 in fees in 1997, about 0.1% of the Firm's revenue 
that year. Its representation was virtually complete at the 
time Gibbons was selected as trustee. In addition, Gibbons 
disclosed that Chase had granted the Firm an 
unconditional waiver of any conflicts which might arise 
from Gibbons's service as trustee. The waiver included an 
authorization permitting the Firm to represent Gibbons in 
any matter adverse to Chase. The district court appointed 
Gibbons as trustee on December 22, 1997 after considering 
the U.S. Trustee's recommendation and reviewing Gibbons's 
disclosure form. 
 
Gibbons subsequently moved for an order authorizing 
employment of the Firm as trustee's counsel. In 
conjunction with this motion, Gibbons submitted an 
affidavit from the Firm which was materially identical to 
Gibbons's prior disclosures in its description of the Firm's 
representation of Chase; it stated that the Firm had 
represented Chase "from time to time," and that it currently 
was representing Chase in the Arts Center financing. 
 
In light of the Firm's relationship with Chase, the Icahn 
interests filed an objection to the Firm's employment as 
counsel, and LaSalle filed a preliminary statement with the 
district court questioning whether the Firm was 
"disinterested," as required by the Bankruptcy Code. 11 
U.S.C. S 327(a). The Firm responded to this statement with 
a letter indicating that it could properly serve as trustee's 
counsel, documenting this claim with Chase's waiver of 
conflicts and a letter mutually terminating all attorney- 
client relations between Chase and the Firm. 
 
The district court held a hearing on January 15, 1998 to 
consider the Firm's employment. At that time, the Firm's 
 
                                10 
  
representation of Chase had already been terminated. 
LaSalle argued that it wanted to reserve its rights to object 
to the Firm's employment if a conflict involving Chase later 
appeared, and stated that "[t]he appearance of a conflict of 
interest . . . creates some discomfort." Similarly, the Icahn 
interests said that "the termination of the [Firm's and 
Chase's attorney-client] relationship does go a long ways 
toward the legal issues that were presented," but that "we 
still have an appearance issue . . . that could impact on 
subsequent determinations by the trustee." Thus, it is clear 
that LaSalle and the Icahn interests were concerned not 
with an actual conflict of interest, but with the 
"appearance" that the Firm would not act impartially. 
 
On January 27, 1998, the district court denied Gibbons's 
motion for an order authorizing employment of the Firm as 
trustee's counsel, reasoning that the Firm's "representation 
of Chase taints the image of objectivity that the trustee and 
his counsel should possess." Gibbons immediatelyfiled 
both this appeal challenging the district court's decision 
and a petition for a writ of mandamus.1  On February 12, 
1998, we granted Gibbons's motion to expedite the appeal 
and petition and consolidated these cases with the Icahn 
interests' prior appeal from the appointment of a trustee. 
 
We review the district court's findings of fact for clear 
error, conduct plenary review over its conclusions of law 
and review its decision to appoint a trustee for abuse of 
discretion. See In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 
1222, 1225-1226 (3d Cir. 1989). The district court's 
disqualification of the Firm is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. See In re BH & P Inc., 949 F.2d 1300, 1317 (3d 
Cir. 1991). "An abuse of discretion exists where the district 
court's decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of 
fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper 
application of law to fact." ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l 




1. Because we will rule in Gibbons's favor on his direct appeal, it is 
unnecessary for us to consider his petition for mandamus. See In re Ford 
Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 964 (3d Cir. 1997). The petition therefore will 
be dismissed as moot. 
 




Because this is an appeal from a district court exercising 
original jurisdiction in bankruptcy, our jurisdiction stems 
from 28 U.S.C. S 1291, not from 28 U.S.C.S 158(d). See In 
re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1038 (3d Cir. 1985). We 
apply a broader concept of "finality" when considering 
bankruptcy appeals under S 1291 than we do when 
considering other civil orders under the same section. Id. at 
1039. A finality determination in a bankruptcy appeal 
involves consideration of such factors as "the impact of the 
matter on the assets of the bankruptcy estate, the 
preclusive effect of a decision on the merits, and whether 
the interests of judicial economy will be furthered." BH & P, 
949 F.2d at 1306 (quoting F/S Airlease II, Inc. v. Simon, 
844 F.2d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 1988)). We see no reason to use 
conflicting standards when a district court, as 
distinguished from a bankruptcy court, has issued an order 
in bankruptcy directly. See Amatex, 755 F.2d at 1039 
(stating in the context of S 1291 that "we have consistently 
considered finality in a more pragmatic and less technical 
way in bankruptcy cases"). 
 
We recognize that the Courts of Appeals are not in total 
agreement on whether a district court order appointing a 
bankruptcy trustee is interlocutory or final. See In re Cajun 
Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 69 F.3d 746, 748 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(appointment of bankruptcy trustee is an immediately 
appealable final order); In re Plaza de Diego Shopping Ctr., 
Inc., 911 F.2d 820, 826 (1st Cir. 1990) (same); Committee of 
Dalkon Shield Claimants v. A.H. Robins Co., 828 F.2d 239, 
241 (4th Cir. 1987) (same). But see In re Cash Currency 
Exch., Inc., 762 F.2d 542, 548 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(unappealable); see also In re St. Charles Preservation 
Investors, Ltd., 916 F.2d 727, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (district 
court order requiring confirmation of permanent trustee 
unappealable). Using the liberal finality rules which apply 
in bankruptcy matters of this nature, we believe that 
jurisdiction is proper over the order appointing a trustee 
here. In the past, we have exercised jurisdiction over a 
district court order affirming a bankruptcy court order 
appointing a trustee. Sharon Steel, 871 F.2d at 1222, 1225- 
1226; see also Plaza de Diego, 911 F.2d at 826 ("If an 
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appeal [from appointment of trustee] were postponed until 
a plan of reorganization were confirmed, there would be no 
satisfactory way to vindicate the" debtor's rights.). Were we 
to put off hearing an appeal of the district court's order 
appointing a trustee until after the entire bankruptcy 
proceeding, allowing the possibility of an order returning 
this bankruptcy to its very beginning for a second round, 
the concept of judicial efficiency would be effectively turned 
on its head. Liberal finality considerations in orders 
appointing bankruptcy trustees are necessary because 
these orders cannot be meaningfully postponed to the 
bankruptcy's conclusion. 
 
Were we not to take jurisdiction at this juncture, no 
meaningful review of the order appointing a trustee could 
ever take place, as a practical matter. What we know as 
men and women we must never forget as judges. Once 
bankruptcy reorganization has been completed after 
months or years and after a plan of reorganization has been 
hammered out, it strains credulity to suggest that a 
reviewing court would jettison years of bankruptcy 
infighting, compromise and final determinations solely for 
the purpose of reversing the appointment of a trustee and 
have the proceedings begin again from scratch. The 
practical reality is that unless an appeal can be lodged now, 
there will never be a meaningful review of the order 
appointing a trustee. We therefore hold that jurisdiction 
over the district court's order appointing a trustee is proper 
pursuant to S 1291. 
 
We believe that the overriding interests of judicial 
economy and the effective finality of the district court's 
decision give us jurisdiction also over Gibbons's appeal of 
the district court's order denying his motion for an order 
approving employment of the Firm as his counsel. Given 
that this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal of the 
appointment of a trustee, considerations of efficiency favor 
hearing this related appeal at the same time. Moreover, 
considering LaSalle's2 concession that the only way 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In addition to LaSalle, Appellees in Gibbons's appeal include the Icahn 
interests, the Official Equity Security Holders' Committee and Toy Biz, 
Inc. Only LaSalle and the Equity Committee filed briefs, and counsel for 
LaSalle argued the case alone. We understand the arguments presented 
by LaSalle to represent the Appellees' collective position. 
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Gibbons could properly continue to serve as trustee is to 
divest all interest in the Firm for the duration of his 
trusteeship, we perceive a most transparent effort to 
remove him as trustee without resort to meeting the 
burdens imposed by the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. 
S 324(a) (trustee may only be removed "for cause"). In 
addition, to delay the appeal of the order denying counsel 
until all matters in the bankruptcy have been conclusively 
determined is impractical, as in the situation of the order 
appointing the trustee. We will not overburden the courts of 
this judicial circuit by requiring the parties to conduct the 
entire bankruptcy proceeding with this issue hanging 
heavily over their heads when we can easily decide it now 
on the facts already on record. For these reasons, 
jurisdiction over Gibbons's appeal is proper pursuant to 
S 1291. 
 




Under the Bankruptcy Code, the district court was 
empowered to appoint a trustee: 
 
       (1) for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, 
       incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs 
       of the debtor by current management, either before or 
       after the commencement of the case, or similar cause, 
       . . . or 
 
       (2) if such appointment is in the interests of creditors, 
       any equity security holders, and other interests of the 
       estate . . . . 
 
11 U.S.C. S 1104(a). The party moving for appointment of a 
trustee, in this case the Lenders, must prove the need for 
a trustee under either subsection by clear and convincing 
evidence. See Sharon Steel, 871 F.2d at 1226. "It is settled 
that appointment of a trustee should be the exception, 
rather than the rule." Id. at 1225. In the usual chapter 11 
proceeding, the debtor remains in possession throughout 
reorganization because "current management is generally 
best suited to orchestrate the process of rehabilitation for 
the benefit of creditors and other interests of the estate." In 
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re V. Savino Oil & Heating Co., 99 B.R. 518, 524 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 1989). Thus, the basis for the strong presumption 
against appointing an outside trustee is that there is often 
no need for one: "The debtor-in-possession is afiduciary of 
the creditors and, as a result, has an obligation to refrain 
from acting in a manner which could damage the estate, or 
hinder a successful reorganization." Petit v. New England 
Mort. Servs., 182 B.R. 64, 69 (D. Me. 1995) (internal 
quotations omitted). The strong presumption alsofinds its 
basis in the debtor-in-possession's usual familiarity with 
the business it had already been managing at the time of 
the bankruptcy filing, often making it the best party to 
conduct operations during the reorganization. See Sharon 
Steel, 871 F.2d at 1226. The facts here, however, militate 
against invoking this presumption. The Icahn interests took 
control over Marvel's management six months after the 
chapter 11 filing. We are not confronted with a debtor who 
possesses extensive familiarity with the company's 
operations. It is therefore inappropriate to suggest that the 
usual presumption should be applied to a Johnny-come- 
lately debtor-in-possession, especially one that is also a 
substantial creditor. 
 
The district court determined that the Icahn interests 
were "unable to resolve conflicts" with creditors of the 
estate. On the basis of this acrimony, it ordered the 
appointment of a trustee. We hold that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion because (A) this acrimony rises 
to the level of "cause" under S 1104(a)(1), and (B) a trustee 




We have not heretofore addressed the question of 
whether acrimony between debtor and creditor in a 
bankruptcy case may rise to the level of "cause" 
necessitating the appointment of a trustee under 
S 1104(a)(1). Cf. Sharon Steel, 871 F.2d at 1228 (finding 
"cause" due to debtor-in-possession's gross 
mismanagement of estate and internal conflicts of interest). 
In Sharon Steel, we noted that the appointment of a trustee 
is mandatory upon a determination of cause, but also that 
"a determination of cause . . . is within the discretion of the 
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court." Id. at 1226 (quoting Dalkon Shield, 828 F.2d at 
242). A review of cases from other circuits, as well as the 
policies behind the appointment of a trustee, demonstrates 
that the district court here properly exercised its discretion 
by invoking S 1104(a)(1) to reach its conclusion. 
 
It is significant that the language of S 1104(a)(1) does not 
promulgate an exclusive list of causes for which a trustee 
must be appointed, but rather provides that a trustee shall 
be appointed "for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, 
incompetence, or gross mismanagement . . . or similar 
cause". The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has 
recognized that "the concepts of incompetence, dishonesty, 
gross mismanagement and even fraud all cover a wide 
range of conduct," and courts must be given the discretion 
necessary to determine if the debtor-in-possession's 
"conduct shown rises to a level sufficient to warrant the 
appointment of a trustee." Dalkon Shield, 828 F.2d at 242 
(internal quotation omitted). This discretionary authority is 
consistent with a "policy of flexibility" permeating the 
Bankruptcy Code's overall aim of protecting creditors while 
giving debtors a second chance. Id. The Code itself, 
therefore, does not prohibit the appointment of a trustee 
based on a finding of acrimony between debtor and 
creditor, parties whose interests must be balanced and 
protected under the discretion of the courts. 
 
Moreover, we are impressed by the persuasive reasoning 
in In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 74 F.3d 599, 600 (5th 
Cir.) (adopting on rehearing the opinion of dissent in 69 
F.3d at 751), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 51 (1996), in which 
the court upheld a trustee appointment based on afinding 
of acrimony. In that case, the debtor-in-possession's 
interests conflicted with those of its creditors to such an 
extent that "the appointment of a trustee may be the only 
effective way to pursue reorganization." The debtor-in- 
possession was a utility cooperative whose board members 
were faced with a federal agency order lowering its utility 
rates. The debtor-in-possession's board members, 
themselves managers or members of the debtor-in- 
possession's individual member utility companies, were 
required to decide whether to appeal the agency order, 
seeking to maintain the high rates charged to the individual 
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member companies and thus to better enable the debtor-in- 
possession to meet its debt obligations to its creditors in 
bankruptcy, or to take no action and charge less to their 
individual companies. Cajun Elec., 69 F.3d at 747. The 
court recognized that the debtor-creditor conflict went 
"beyond the `inherent' conflicts under which all healthy 
cooperatives operate." Cajun Elec., 74 F.3d at 600 (adopting 
dissent at 69 F.3d at 751). The extent of this conflict alone 
provided sufficient cause for the appointment of a trustee 
under S 1104(a)(1). 
 
In Cajun Electric, the court recognized that all 
cooperatives operate amidst certain "inherent" conflicts of 
interest, but rejected the notion that its holding created a 
" `per se rule' under which any cooperative seeking Chapter 
11 protection would be automatically subject to the 
appointment of a trustee." Id. Rather, the teachings of this 
case are that a district court may find cause to appoint a 
trustee for "acrimony" only on a case-by-case basis, when 
the inherent conflicts extend beyond the healthy conflicts 
that always exist between debtor and creditor, or as it 
found in that case, when the parties "begin working at 
cross-purposes". 
 
We therefore adopt the reasoning in Cajun Electric, 74 
F.3d at 600 (adopting dissent at 69 F.3d at 751), and apply 
its teachings to the case at bar. Here the district court 
found that "the Debtors, as controlled by the Icahn 
interests, and the Lenders, take dramatically different 
stances on many issues." Citing (1) the debtor-in- 
possession's institution of several adversary actions, (2) the 
unconsummated settlements, (3) the U.S. Trustee's opinion 
"that the parties seem to be unable to reach a consensus" 
and (4) its observations that "the Debtors and the Lenders 
have flung accusations at each other, and have failed to 
demonstrate any ability to resolve matters cooperatively," 
the district court concluded that "there is no reasonable 
likelihood of any cooperation between the parties in the 
near future." As in Cajun Electric, 74 F.3d at 600 (adopting 
dissent at 69 F.3d at 751), the district court did not clearly 
err, based on its review of these events, when it found a 
deep conflict to exist between the Icahn-controlled debtor- 
in-possession and the creditors in bankruptcy. Also like 
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Cajun Electric, "this is a large and messy bankruptcy that 
promises to get worse without a disinterested administrator 
at the helm." Id.; see also In re Colorado-Ute Elec. Assoc., 
Inc., 120 B.R. 164, 176 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (finding 
cause to appoint trustee under S 1104(a)(1) when the court 
could not "envision a way for the current management and 
board to resolve the inherent conflict between what is best 
for Colorado-Ute, its creditors and the co-op members"). 
 
We expressly hold that there is no per se rule by which 
mere conflicts or acrimony between debtor and creditor 
mandate the appointment of a trustee. In this case, rather, 
we are faced with circumstances in which the Icahn 
interests, themselves creditors of the Perelman holding 
companies, are currently in control of the debtor at the 
same time that the debtor proposes reorganization plans. In 
this position, although the Icahn interests are technically 
and officially fiduciaries to all creditors, they would also be 
placed in an awkward position of evaluating their own 
indenture and debt claims. Having found that this 
unhealthy conflict of interest was manifest in the"deep- 
seeded conflict and animosity" between the Icahn-controlled 
debtor and the Lenders and in the lack of confidence all 
creditors had in the Icahn interests' ability to act as 
fiduciaries, the district court did not depart from the proper 
exercise of discretion when it determined sufficient cause 
existed under S 1104(a)(1) to appoint a neutral trustee to 
facilitate reorganization. 
 
We reject the Icahn interests' argument that unhappy 
creditors involved in future bankruptcies could remove the 
debtors-in-possession by their obstinate refusal to 
cooperate. We are not impressed by this argumentum ad 
terrorem. In the view we take, it is within the district court's 
sound discretion to make a determination of cause, and 
this requires fact-finding and application of the facts to 
relevant precepts. The district court here determined that 
the Icahn interests were not entirely without blame for the 
breakdown of reorganization efforts with the Lenders: 
"[T]here can be no question that the debtor-in-possession 
has demonstrated difficulty resolving its conflicts with other 
parties, such as the Lenders." The district court noted that 
the Icahn-controlled debtor-in-possession instituted 
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litigation against Perelman without seeking the approval of 
the bankruptcy court; moreover, the debtor-in-possession 
was represented by counsel who had not previously entered 
an appearance in the case. In addition, the day after the 
district court "made clear that it did not want to interfere 
with the bankruptcy court's ability to resolve the underlying 
dispute," the Icahn interests sent a letter to the bankruptcy 
court which "incorrectly stated that while that motion [on 
jurisdiction] was pending, the bankruptcy court was 
required to refrain from taking further action." This caused 
the bankruptcy court to cancel a hearing on the 
appointment of a trustee. Such actions by a debtor-in- 
possession have been sufficient for other courts to find 
cause for appointment of a trustee. See, e.g. , V. Savino Oil, 
99 B.R. at 526 (debtor-in-possession failed to disclose to 
court corporate relationship with entity uninvolved in 
bankruptcy case and "made affirmative efforts to 
misrepresent or conceal" material matters). 
 
Finally, the policies behind the appointment of a trustee 
support our conclusion. The appointment of a trustee is the 
installation of a court officer charged with fiduciary duties. 
The district court's determination that cause existed to 
appoint an independent trustee based on the Icahn 
interests' actions is a recognition of their failure to assume 
these duties. When the chapter 11 petition was filed in this 
case, the debtor-in-possession assumed the samefiduciary 
duties as would an appointed trustee; the Icahn interests 
later stepped into this fiduciary position when they took 
control of Marvel. See 11 U.S.C. S 1107(a); United States v. 
Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 200 n.3 (1983). These 
obligations include "[o]pen, honest and straightforward 
disclosure to the Court and creditors." See V. Savino Oil, 99 
B.R. at 526. The Icahn interests' actions surrounding the 
Perelman litigation fall short of this fiduciary benchmark. 
Also among the fiduciary obligations of a debtor-in- 
possession is the "duty to protect and conserve property in 
its possession for the benefit of creditors." In re Ionosphere 
Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). The 
intense and high-stakes bickering between the Icahn 
interests and the Lenders does not instill confidence that 
the Icahn interests could fairly negotiate with the creditors 
to whom they owe these duties, nor that reorganization will 
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occur effectively. See, e.g., In re Bellevue Place Assocs., 171 
B.R. 615, 623 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994) (finding no wrongful 
conduct by debtor-in-possession but an inability to control 
reorganization, thus an inability to discharge fiduciary 
duties, necessitating appointment of trustee "to unfreeze" 
unproductive negotiations). 
 
As one bankruptcy court has noted: 
 
       The willingness of Congress to leave a debtor-in- 
       possession is premised on an expectation that current 
       management can be depended upon to carry out the 
       fiduciary responsibilities of a trustee. And if the debtor- 
       in-possession defaults in this respect, Section 
       1104(a)(1) commands that the stewardship of the 
       reorganization effort must be turned over to an 
       independent trustee. 
 
V. Savino Oil, 99 B.R. at 526. Here, the district court acted 
within the proper bounds of discretion in appointing a 
trustee under S 1104(a)(1) because of the Icahn interests' 




Unlike S 1104(a)(1), which provides for mandatory 
appointment upon a specific finding of cause, S 1104(a)(2) 
"envisions a flexible standard." It gives the district court 
discretion to appoint a trustee "when to do so would serve 
the parties' and estate's interests." Sharon Steel, 871 F.2d 
at 1226. Here the court found that "deep seeded conflict 
and animosity between a debtor and its creditors" is at the 
heart of this bankruptcy case, thus "the selection of a plan, 
whatever its details, is in the best interests of all parties, 
and the best way to achieve that result is to appoint a 
trustee." Even if we were of the view that the appointment 
of a trustee was not mandated by the analysis required in 
S 1104(a)(1), we are satisfied that the district court's 
determination would come within proper exercise of 
discretion under the flexible S 1104(a)(2) standard. The level 
of acrimony found to exist in this case certainly makes the 
appointment of a trustee in the best interests of the parties 
and the estate. 
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In Petit, 182 B.R. at 70, for example, numerous discovery 
disputes between the debtor-in-possession and creditors led 
the bankruptcy court to appoint a trustee, a decision 
upheld by the district court because this "may be the only 
way that the bankruptcy court can ensure that 
reorganization will proceed." The district court in that case 
described the impasse reached between the parties: 
 
       The tangled history of these proceedings suggests that 
       "friction" will continue at an unacceptable level. While 
       some degree of antagonism and animosity between a 
       debtor and creditors can be expected in any 
       bankruptcy proceeding, it has reached a particular 
       intensity here which is complicating efforts to 
       "reorganize" the Debtor. 
 
Id. The court also focused on the discretionary nature of 
the appointment decision, which involves to some extent 
weighing equities, stating, "the balance of interests here 
weighs in favor of appointing a trustee." Id. at 71. 
 
Similarly in this case, the district court's lengthy account 
of this complex bankruptcy case, in which "the parties are 
sharply divided on many issues, and are presently 
incapable of resolving them," supported its exercise of 
discretion to appoint a trustee, exactly as the court had 
done in Petit. See id. at 70 ("deep-seeded conflict and 
animosity between a debtor and its creditors provides a 
basis for the appointment of a trustee"); see also Colorado- 
Ute, 120 B.R. at 176 (appointment of trustee in interests of 
parties where "serious conflicts . . . between and among the 
debtor, its board and creditors [made] the prospect for 
gridlock seem more probable than the ability to rehabilitate 
the debtor"); In re The Bible Speaks, 74 B.R. 511, 512 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (appointing trustee when"friction 
[had] developed between the Debtor and the Creditors' 
Committee which threaten[ed] to engulf this estate in costly 
and legalistic bickering over the entire range of the 
reorganization process"). 
 
We also reject the Icahn interests' arguments that the 
district court must apply a strict cost-benefit analysis when 
deciding to appoint a trustee. This is a case of profound 
financial magnitude, involving approximately $1 billion in 
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claims against the estate. See In re Sharon Steel Corp., 86 
B.R. 455, 466 (W.D. Pa. 1988) ("In a case of this 
magnitude, the cost of having a trustee in place is 
insignificant when compared with the other costs of 
administration and when compared with the enormous 
benefit to be achieved by the establishment of trust and 
confidence in . . . management."). 
 
Neither did the court abuse its discretion by deciding not 
to appoint an examiner in the trustee's stead: "I'm just not 
convinced that an examiner is going to get done what needs 
to get done here. I think we need a decision-maker to come 
in and make some decisions." See Petit, 182 B.R. at 72 ("it 
would be more efficient and less costly simply to appoint a 
trustee now . . . since a trustee has the power to perform 
all of the functions of an examiner"). Under the Bankruptcy 
Code, a trustee is given all the powers of an examiner to 
analyze and report on the interests of the parties and 
actions of the debtor, but is also given the power to act on 
behalf of the estate, including the filing of a reorganization 
plan. 11 U.S.C. SS 1106(a)(5), (b). An examiner is not a 
substitute for a trustee. The district court need not have 
favored the appointment of an examiner here, especially 
after finding that a trustee is the more appropriate position. 
See In re Patton's Busy Bee Disposal Serv., Inc., 182 B.R. 
681, 685 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995) ("The position of examiner 
is not a device to circumvent the appointment of a 
trustee."). 
 
Whether viewed from S 1104(a)(1) or (a)(2), the district 
court acted within appropriate bounds of discretion in 
appointing a trustee to act as a neutral and efficient 
fiduciary in this complicated bankruptcy under the 




Having concluded that the district court was within its 
discretion in ordering the appointment of a trustee, we turn 
now to Gibbons's appeal. Gibbons argues that the district 
court erred when it disapproved the employment of the 
Firm as trustee's counsel. 
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The Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee of a bankruptcy 
estate to employ attorneys to assist him in his duties. 11 
U.S.C. S 327(a). In determining the standards under which 
an attorney may serve in this capacity, we must, of course, 
begin with the language of the statute. Section 327(a) first 
provides that the trustee may employ attorneys "that do not 
hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate." See 
also S 327(c) (district court shall disapprove trustee's 
employment of an attorney who has represented a creditor 
"if there is an actual conflict of interest"). Section 327(a) 
also requires that the attorney be a "disinterested 
person[ ]." A "disinterested person" is defined, in relevant 
part, as a person who: 
 
       does not have an interest materially adverse to the 
       interest of the estate or of any class of creditors or 
       equity security holders, by reason of any direct or 
       indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, 
       the debtor or an investment banker specified in 
       subparagraph (B) or (C) of this paragraph, or for any 
       other reason. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 101(14)(E). A plain reading of this section 
suggests that one is a "disinterested person" only if he has 
an interest that is materially adverse to a party in interest 
in the bankruptcy. The interest in question may be 
materially adverse either for one of the specific reasons 
delineated in the statute or "for any other reason." 
 
We conclude that in considering Gibbons's motion for an 
order authorizing employment of the Firm as trustee's 
counsel, the district court applied an incorrect legal 
standard under SS 327(a) and 101(14)(E), and even under 
the proper standard its denial of the motion was not a 




We previously interpreted the standards applicable to 
employment of trustee's counsel under SS 327(a) and 
101(14)(E) in BH & P, 949 F.2d 1300. Insofar as both 
parties have somewhat misread BH & P, and urge upon us 
such conflicting interpretations of it, we have studied our 
previous decision in great detail and today expressly 
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reiterate its holding: (1) Section 327(a), as well as S 327(c), 
imposes a per se disqualification as trustee's counsel of any 
attorney who has an actual conflict of interest; (2) the 
district court may within its discretion--pursuant to 
S 327(a) and consistent with S 327(c)--disqualify an 
attorney who has a potential conflict of interest and (3) the 
district court may not disqualify an attorney on the 
appearance of conflict alone. 
 
In BH & P, an S corporation and both of its principal 
shareholders each filed for bankruptcy. The cases were 
consolidated and a single trustee and law firm were 
appointed to represent all three estates. Id. at 1303. After 
the corporation filed a fraud and breach of fiduciary duty 
suit against the shareholders, the corporation's primary 
secured lender alleged that the trustee and the lawfirm 
had a conflict of interest. Id. at 1304. The district court 
disqualified the trustee and the law firm from serving the 
shareholders' estates, and we affirmed. 
 
In reiterating BH & P's precise rule on attorney 
disqualification under S 327(a), we focus only on that 
section of BH & P which discussed the standards for 
attorney disqualification. In Part IV of the opinion, we said: 
 
       While the bankruptcy court recognized that by the 
       terms of section 327(c) "disapproval of employment is 
       mandatory where there is an actual conflict," it does 
       not follow "that there is no discretion [under section 
       327(a)] to disapprove employment when the conflict is 
       `potential' ". The court then held that 
 
       [t]he court should generally disapprove employment 
       of a professional with a potential conflict, with 
       certain possible exceptions. First of all, . . . there 
       may occasionally be large cases where every 
       competent professional in a particular field is already 
       employed by a creditor or a party in interest . . . . 
 
        The other exception is where the possibility that 
       the potential conflict will become actual is remote, 
       and the reasons for employing the professional in 
       question are particularly compelling. This court will 
       not attempt here to define the parameters of this 
       exception, which necessarily will depend upon the 
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       facts of a particular case. I will, however, note that 
       even in such situations, employment of a 
       professional with a potential conflict is disfavored. 
 
        We do not find error in the bankruptcy court's 
       articulation of the standard governing conflict of 
       interest applicable to professionals. . . . As we have 
       said, denomination of a conflict as "potential" or 
       "actual" and the decision concerning whether to 
       disqualify a professional based upon that 
       determination in situations not yet rising to the level of 
       an actual conflict are matters committed to the 
       bankruptcy court's sound exercise of discretion. 
 
Id., 949 F.2d at 1316-1317 (citations omitted). 
 
This passage clearly indicates that S 327(a) allows 
disqualification of attorneys only if they have an actual or 
a potential conflict of interest. In addition, the first sentence 
of the passage cuts against the trustee's contention, in light 
of S 327(c), that the Firm may only be disqualified based on 
an actual conflict. 
 
We reiterate the teachings of BH & P: Section 327(a) 
presents a per se bar to the appointment of a lawfirm with 
an actual conflict, and gives the district court wide 
discretion in deciding whether to approve the appointment 
of a law firm with a potential conflict. Therefore, the district 
court erred when it held that it could disqualify as 
disinterested any person who "in the slightest degree might 
have some interest or relationship that would even faintly 
color the independence and impartial attitude required by 
the Code and the Bankruptcy Rules." App. at 39 (quoting 
BH & P, 949 F.2d at 1308, in turn quoting isolated 
language from the district court opinion in that case, not 
our discussion of the standards for attorney 
disqualification). Following this faulty reasoning, LaSalle 
contends that section 327(a), as interpreted in BH & P, 
allows disqualification of a law firm for a mere "appearance 
of impropriety." We disagree with this contention. 
 
To be sure, BH & P, 949 F.2d at 1313, does contain a 
reference to the "appearance of conflict." For several 
reasons, however, we find this reference to be"a marginal 
comment [which] will not bear the heavy weight [LaSalle 
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has] placed on it." See Rivet v. Regions Bank, 66 U.S.L.W. 
4132, 4134 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1998) (declining to credit a 
previous footnote that was not essential to the decision in 
the previous case). First, part IV of BH & P, which interprets 
section 327(a) and from which we quoted extensively above, 
makes no mention whatsoever of appearances of conflict. 
Part IV mentions only actual and potential conflicts. 
Second, we do not believe that BH & P's discussion of 
S 101(14)(E)'s disinterest requirement, as applied to the 
disqualification of a trustee, mandates a conclusion that 
apparent conflicts alone allow a finding of 
disinterestedness. In this context, we said in BH & P that 
"[i]n some circumstances, the potential for conflict and the 
appearance of conflict may, without more, justify removing 
a trustee from service." Id. at 1313. At the risk of parsing 
language too finely, the conjunctive reference to potential 
conflict and appearance of conflict indicates that the two 
together, but not appearance alone, can justify 
disqualification. This conclusion is supported by the next 
passage of our opinion, where we note that "it must be 
made clear that `[h]orrible imaginings alone cannot be 
allowed to carry the day. Not every conceivable conflict 
must result in sending [the trustee] away to lick his 
wounds.' " Id. (quoting In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 183 (1st 
Cir. 1987)). To allow disqualification merely on the 
"appearance of impropriety" indeed would allow"horrible 
imaginings alone" to carry the day. Finally, in BH & P we 
affirmed the district court's determination that the 
attorneys in that case had an "actual conflict of interest." 
Id. at 1315, 1317. In light of this determination, we do not 
find BH & P's transitory reference to the appearance of 
conflict to be controlling. We therefore reject LaSalle's 
invitation to read an appearance of conflict disqualification 
into S 327(a). Section 327(a) permitted the district court to 
disqualify the Firm only if it had an actual or potential 




Even applying the proper standard, the district court's 
disqualification of the Firm would amount to an abuse of 
discretion. The Firm's conflict here is not potential or 
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actual. LaSalle acknowledges as much when it states that 
its concern is "the ability of [the Firm] to act with total 
objectivity and avoid even the appearance of `possible 
unfairness and partiality.' " LaSalle's Br. at 28 (quoting the 
district court's opinion). The Firm has never represented 
Chase on a matter related to this bankruptcy and severed 
all attorney-client relations with Chase in anticipation of its 
selection as trustee's counsel. If we were to uphold the 
district court's order under these circumstances, it is with 
the utmost difficulty that we could imagine how a law firm 
with any prior relationship to a secured creditor could ever 
serve as trustee's counsel. Such a result would be 
tantamount to a per se rule, which we refused to adopt in 
BH & P. 
 
The district court's exercise of its discretion is further 
called into question by the anomalous situation in which it 
approved Gibbons's appointment as the trustee in this 
case, and then disapproved the employment of the Firm, in 
which he is the first named partner, as trustee's counsel. 
Sauce for the goose, then, is not sauce for the gander. The 
disclosures in reference to both Gibbons's appointment and 
the Firm's employment are the same. They revealed the 
Firm's representation of Chase and that Chase had granted 
the Firm an unconditional waiver of conflicts. Also, unlike 
when the court approved Gibbons's appointment as trustee, 
while the motion for approval of the Firm's employment as 
counsel was pending, Chase and the Firm terminated their 
attorney-client relationship. Given these facts, a logical 
basis for this inconsistency is evanescent, if not 
infinitesimal. There is an irreconcilable conflict with 
dictates of good reason in the notion that Gibbons, as the 
head of the Firm, is eligible to serve as trustee, but the 
Firm is ineligible to serve as his counsel. 
 
This anomaly is particularly troubling and augments the 
primary reason why we reverse the district court's denial of 
the trustee's motion. We reverse the district court because 
it utilized a faulty premise in reaching its conclusion. It 
applied the incorrect legal standard and thus strayed 
beyond an appropriate exercise of discretion by 
disqualifying the Firm under S 327(a) based solely on the 
appearance of conflict. The trustee was within his rights 
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and prerogative to select the Firm as his counsel. To deny 
the trustee's choice was to commit reversible error. 
 
* * * * * * * * * 
 
In sum, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 to 
review the district court's orders authorizing appointment of 
the bankruptcy trustee and disapproving the Firm as 
trustee's counsel. The district court properly exercised its 
discretion in appointing a trustee under either 11 U.S.C. 
S 1104(a)(1) or (a)(2) because "cause" includes the acrimony 
found here between the Icahn-controlled debtor-in- 
possession and the creditors and because on these facts 
the appointment of a trustee was in the best interests of the 
parties and the bankruptcy estate. Therefore, its order 
appointing a trustee will be affirmed. 
 
The district court exceeded permissible bounds of 
discretion, however, when it applied an inappropriate legal 
precept to deny Gibbons's motion for an order authorizing 
employment of the Firm as trustee's counsel. The Firm does 
not have an actual or potential conflict of interest and may 
not be disqualified under 11 U.S.C. SS 327(a) and 
101(14)(E). The district court's order will be reversed, and 
the case will be remanded with directions that the district 
court enter an order approving the Firm's employment. 
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